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Smothering Freedom of Association:
The Alaska Supreme Court Errs in
Upholding the State’s Blanket Primary
Statute
This Note analyzes the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in
O’Callaghan v. State that upheld the constitutionality of the state’s
blanket primary law. The Note first describes the factual background of the case, then discusses United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding freedom of association and election law
challenges. It next applies this jurisprudence to test the validity of
the blanket primary law in Alaska and compares the result with
the Alaska Supreme Court’s reasoning in the O’Callaghan decision. The Note finds that the blanket primary statute severely
burdens freedom of association, cannot be justified by a compelling state interest, and therefore should have been held unconstitutional.

I. INTRODUCTION
Striking a severe blow to the associational rights of political
party members, the Alaska Supreme Court, in O’Callaghan v.
1
State, upheld as constitutional the state’s blanket primary law. At
issue in the case was whether a state statute providing for a blanket
primary election unconstitutionally violates the associational rights
of the state Republican party and its members by requiring them
to include members of other political parties in the Republican
primary.
This Note contends that it was error for the O’Callaghan court
to uphold the statute on the basis of merely “legitimate and impor2
tant” state interests. Instead, in light of United States Supreme
Court precedent which has established the test to be applied to
election laws burdening associational rights, the Alaska Supreme
Copyright © 1997 by Alaska Law Review
The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable advice provided by Professor Robinson O. Everett, as well as the pleadings and other materials supplied
by attorneys Kenneth P. Jacobus, Max F. Gruenberg, Jr., and George Waters, the
contribution of which was vital in the preparation of this Note.
1. 914 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1690 (1997).
2. See id. at 1262-63.

523

CASTRO.CON

524

12/09/97 11:55 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:2

Court should have required the state to justify the statute by
showing that it was narrowly tailored to advance compelling state
interests. This Note also argues that the interests asserted by
Alaska to justify the blanket primary are insufficient to withstand
strict scrutiny.
The O’Callaghan majority further erred by disregarding controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, the holdings of
which resolve the issue in O’Callaghan. This controlling precedent
3
includes Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, which established that political parties have the right to determine who
may participate in their candidate selection process, and Demo4
cratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette,
which held that a political party may not be compelled to abide by
the results of an open primary.
Part II of this Note recounts the facts and holding of
O’Callaghan. Part III discusses the development of United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding freedom of association
and election law challenges. Finally, Part IV applies this jurisprudence to the facts of O’Callaghan to argue that O’Callaghan was
wrongly decided.
It is instructive to preface this discussion by distinguishing
among the three types of primary election systems. In a closed
primary, only members of the sponsoring political party may participate in the party’s primary election. Within the class of primaries that are closed, some require affiliation with the party for a period of time prior to the primary election, while others permit
voters to declare an affiliation at the time of primary voting. The
5
vast majority of states use closed primaries of some variety.
In an open primary, any voter may vote for candidates for any
party’s nomination, but the voter may vote only for candidates
running for one party’s nomination. In a blanket primary, any
voter may vote for candidates for any party’s nomination, but — in
contrast to an open primary — the voter may vote for candidates
6
for the nomination of different political parties for various offices.
For example, in a blanket primary such as the one envisioned by
the statute at issue, a registered Republican could vote for an independent for Governor, a Democrat for the U.S. House, and a
Republican for the state Senate.

3. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
4. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
5. See O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1254-55.
6. See id. For further description of closed, open, and blanket primaries, see
JOHN F. BIBBY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 133-37 (3d ed.
1996).
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In addition to Alaska, Louisiana7 and Washington8 have blanket primaries. California voters recently approved a voter initia9
tive authorizing a blanket primary, though it has yet to go into ef10
fect and is being challenged in federal court.
It is also worthwhile at the outset to consider Alaska’s unique
electoral composition, characterized by its unusually large number
of undeclared and non-partisan voters relative to the number of
party-affiliated voters. In August 1997, there were 431,976 regis11
tered voters in Alaska. Of these, 16,895 were registered independents, 72,916 were registered Democrats, 106,983 were registered Republicans, and 3,157 were registered Green party
12
members. At the same time, there were 142,244 undeclared and
13
84,780 non-partisan registered voters.
II. O’CALLAGHAN V. STATE
Alaska Statutes section 15.25.060 provides for a primary
wherein all primary candidates are listed on a single ballot
14
“without regard to their party affiliation.” Any voter may vote for
any of the candidates, regardless of the party affiliation of the
voter or of the candidate. Known as a blanket primary, this type of
primary election was first enacted in Alaska in 1947 after a refer15
endum.
In 1990, the Republican Party of Alaska (“RPA”) enacted a
7. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:401 (West 1997). At press time, the Supreme Court of the United States was reviewing a Fifth Circuit decision which
held that Louisiana’s election scheme violates federal laws that set a uniform federal election day for members of Congress. See Love v. Foster, 90 F.3d 1026 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997). In a subsequent clarification of its
decision, the Fifth Circuit observed that Louisiana could conform with federal
law, without necessarily abandoning its open primary system, by rescheduling the
elections. See Love v. Foster, 100 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 1996).
8. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29.18.200 (1996).
9. See Cal. Prop. 198 (1996) (to be codified at CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2001
(West 1997)).
10. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
11. See STATE OF ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS BY PARTY WITHIN DISTRICT (Aug. 4, 1997).
12. See id.
13. See id. As of November 1994, there were 340,464 registered voters in
Alaska. Of these, 12,936 were registered independents, 59,782 were registered
Democrats, 78,212 were registered Republicans, and 2,558 were registered Green
party members. At the same time, there were 94,282 undeclared and 88,099 nonpartisan registered voters. See Supplemental Brief of Appellee State at App. 1,
O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1996) (No. S-6249, 4338).
14. ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.060 (Michie 1996).
15. See O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1254-56 (Alaska 1996).
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party rule that provided that only registered Republicans, registered independents, and registered voters who state no preference
of party affiliation may vote in Republican primaries.16 Due to the
obvious conflict between this party rule and the blanket primary
statute, the Republican Party sued the State in federal court, chal17
lenging the statute’s constitutionality. Agreeing with the RPA,
Judge James K. Singleton orally announced his “tentative deci18
sion” that Alaska’s blanket primary statute infringed on the
RPA’s right to free political association in violation of the United
19
States Supreme Court’s opinion in Tashjian.
Subsequent to the judge’s announcement, but prior to his entry of judgment in the matter, the RPA and the State agreed to
certain stipulations and to dismissal of the suit. The district court
approved the stipulations and dismissed the case without prejudice. The stipulations provided for two separate ballots for primary elections, the effect of which was that the 1992 Republican
primary was conducted in accord with the Party rule, not the blan20
ket primary law. One ballot listed only Republican candidates,
and was available only to Republican, non-partisan, and undeclared voters. The other ballot listed all other candidates, and was
available to all voters. Voters, of course, could vote only one of
these ballots.
Following the stipulation, and before the 1992 primary, the
Director of Elections adopted emergency temporary regulations,
21
implementing the two-ballot system described in the stipulation.
The Director adopted identical permanent regulations prior to the
22
1994 primary. The 1992 and 1994 elections were conducted pur23
suant to these regulations.
Then, a voter in the 1992 primary election, Mike O’Callaghan,
filed a complaint against the Lieutenant Governor in Alaska Supe16. See REPUBLICAN PARTY OF ALASKA, RPA RULES XIV § 1 (1996).
17. See Zawacki v. State, No. A92-414-CV (D. Alaska filed May 26, 1992).
18. Judge Singleton explained his practice of announcing tentative decisions
as follows:
The important thing about a tentative decision is to alert you to the conclusions that I have reached legally and factually after reviewing your
materials and the factual materials you have submitted . . . . So, again by
announcing tentative decisions I am not suggesting that my find is fixed
in stone or that I am absolutely invulnerable to persuasion but only to
suggest to you any factual or legal errors I may be laboring under so that
in the course of your argument you can correct them.
O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1253 n.2.
19. See id. at 1252-53.
20. See id. at 1253.
21. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, §§ 28.010-.050 (1992).
22. See id. §§ 28.100-.150 (1993).
23. See O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1253.
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rior Court challenging the legality of the 1992 primary election.
O’Callaghan asserted that the stipulated regulations providing for
a two-ballot primary were inconsistent with state election law. The
State argued that the regulations were valid because of the clear
unconstitutionality of the blanket primary statute under Tashjian.24
The court granted summary judgment for the State, and
O’Callaghan appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court.
25
The Alaska Supreme Court, in O’Callaghan v. Coghill, invalidated the stipulation because, through the stipulation, the state
had effectively declared a law unconstitutional. The court noted
that “a stipulation or consent judgment declaring a law unconstitu26
tional is not valid” except in cases of clear unconstitutionality.
The clear unconstitutionality of the blanket primary statute had
27
not been established, the court concluded. Although the court
declined to decide the constitutionality of the blanket primary
28
statute, it invited the submission of briefs addressing the question.
Following the election of a Democratic governor, the state
abruptly changed course and argued that the statute was constitutional. It was only at this point that the RPA became involved in
the O’Callaghan suit. The court granted the RPA’s motion to intervene, and the RPA argued against the statute’s constitutionality. Alaskan Voters for an Open Primary were also allowed to intervene. The Alaska Federation of Natives filed an amicus curiae
brief, and the Alaskan Independence Party filed a submission in
lieu of an amicus curiae brief. Of these groups, only the RPA argued that the blanket primary was unconstitutional.
29
Deciding the issue in O’Callaghan v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court held that Alaska’s statute providing for a single blan30
ket primary election is constitutional. The court declined to apply
strict scrutiny to the blanket primary statute and instead upheld
the law on the basis of state interests that were only “legitimate
31
and important.”
The majority conceded that under Alaska’s blanket primary
system, political parties’ association rights are burdened in two
32
ways: the potential for “raiding” is increased and the potential for

24. See O’Callaghan v. Coghill, 888 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Alaska 1995).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1303.
27. See id. at 1305.
28. See id.
29. 914 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1996).
30. See id. at 1263.
31. Id. at 1262-63.
32. Party raiding has been defined as “the organized switching of blocs of
voters from one party to another in order to manipulate the outcome of the other
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a loss of accountability of candidates to party principles and platform is heightened.33 But whatever the burden, the O’Callaghan
majority reasoned, it is outweighed by the state’s interests in (1)
encouraging voter turnout, (2) maximizing voters’ choices of candidates, and (3) ensuring that elected officials have broad-based
34
constituencies. The court stopped short of describing these interests as “compelling,” instead calling them “legitimate and impor35
tant.” The court ordered that the 1996 primary be a blanket primary, but refused O’Callaghan’s request to order new elections for
1992 and 1994, which had been conducted pursuant to the stipula36
tion.
Justice Rabinowitz, dissenting, argued that the blanket primary statute impermissibly burdens the RPA’s political rights of
37
association in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Relying on several United States Supreme Court cases, Justice
Rabinowitz concluded that the blanket primary law should be
subjected to strict scrutiny because the statute significantly interfered with the right of a political party to nominate candidates of
38
its choice.
On June 14, 1996, the RPA filed an application in the United
States Supreme Court, seeking a stay of the Alaska Supreme
Court’s O’Callaghan opinion. The stay was not granted, and
Alaska’s 1996 primary was conducted as a blanket primary elec39
tion.
Also in June 1996, the RPA, seeking reversal of O’Callaghan,
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Su40
preme Court. Nearly a year after the filing of the certiorari petiparty’s primary election.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 n.9 (1983).
33. See O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1263.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 1262-63.
36. See id. at 1263.
37. See id. at 1264 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
38. See id. (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428
(1992); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214
(1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 379 U.S. 208 (1986); Democratic
Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex. rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981)).
39. See Republican Party of Alaska v. O’Callaghan, 116 S. Ct. 2582 (1996)
(denying application for stay).
40. The questions presented in the petition for certiorari were
(1) Whether this decision conflicts with prior free political association
decisions of [the Supreme Court] such as Burdick v. Takushi, Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, and Democratic Party of the United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette.
(2) Whether it is a violation of the First Amendment right of free political association for the State of Alaska to require the Republican Party
to participate in a blanket primary election, in which registered Demo-
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tion, the Court on May 12, 1997, denied cert.41 However, in other
jurisdictions, including the District of Alaska, legal challenges to
42
blanket and open primaries continue.
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Right to Associate
Political parties and their “adherents enjoy a constitutionally43
protected right of political association.” This right grants parties
and their members “‘the freedom to associate with others for the
44
common advancement of political beliefs and ideas . . . .’”
In the first case to enunciate formally the right to freedom of
45
association, Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, stated
that it “is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
46
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” This seminal
47
case, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, established freedom
of association as a separate constitutional right emanating from the
First Amendment’s guarantees of speech, press, petition, and as-

crats and members of other political parties may vote on Republican
nominees, as a condition of placing Republican candidates on the
Alaska general election ballot.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Republican Party of Alaska v. O’Callaghan,
117 S. Ct. 1690 (1997) (No. 95-1962).
41. See Republican Party of Alaska, 117 S. Ct. at 1690.
42. See infra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
43. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975) (holding that state election
law governing selection of delegates to a national party convention would not be
accorded primacy over the rules of a national political party).
44. Id. (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973)).
45. The Court subsequently recognized two distinct types of freedom of association. One, the freedom of intimate, or intrinsic, association encompasses personal choices to enter into and maintain close human relationships, and is protected as a fundamental element of personal liberty. See Roberts v. Unites States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (concluding that a Minnesota statute that
compelled Jaycees, a traditionally all-male organization, to accept women into
membership did not abridge the Jaycees’s right to free association). The other
type of freedom of association, and the one implicated here, is freedom of expressive association, or the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in activities
protected by the First Amendment, such as speech, assembly, worship, and petition for redress of grievances. See id. at 622.
46. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (citation
omitted).
47. Id.
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sembly.48 It also made this protection applicable to the states
49
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
With respect to this right, the Court observed, “we have long
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected
by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
50
education, religious, and cultural ends.” Significantly, the Court
went on to state that “[f]reedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate [with those not sharing the views
51
of the group’s members].” Similarly, the Court has stated that
“the freedom to associate for the ‘common advancement of political beliefs,’ necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the
people who constitute the association, and to limit the association
52
to those people only.”
B. The Supreme Court’s Test for Election Laws that Affect the
Right to Associate
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address specifically
the constitutionality of blanket primaries, it has nonetheless developed a test that may be used to analyze the constitutional validity
of Alaska’s blanket primary statute, and of other election laws that
53
abridge associational rights. In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Supreme Court first articulated the test to be used in assessing consti54
tutional challenges to election laws. A court
must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the
[s]tate as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider
the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden

48. See id; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-08
(1982) (quoting Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15
(1976) (quoting Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460) (reiterating that the First Amendment
protects political association and political expression). It is self-evident that the
effective exercise of the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly often
requires associational activity.
49. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
50. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 623.
52. Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450
U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
53. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
54. See id. at 789.
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the plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the
reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged
55
provision is unconstitutional.

The test, then, weighs the asserted state interests against the injury
alleged and considers the fit between the asserted interests and the
regulation at issue.
The petitioner in Anderson was independent presidential candidate John Anderson who, along with three voters, challenged an
Ohio statute that required independent candidates to file in March
56
to appear on the general election ballot in November. Applying
its test, the Court began by assessing the burden imposed by the
statute. The Court found that setting such an early filing deadline
simultaneously precluded independent candidates from entering
the presidential race after March and limited the effectiveness of
independent candidates who attempted to meet the March dead57
line. Therefore, the Court found that the law burdened the associational and voting rights of Anderson’s supporters and other
58
“independent-minded voters.” The Court characterized the burden imposed by the early filing deadline as one that “may have a
59
substantial impact on independent-minded voters.”
The Court then assessed the legitimacy of Ohio’s asserted interests in voter education, equal treatment for all candidates, and
political party stability, as well as the extent to which the chal60
lenged law serves these interests. Although the Court found the
first interest to be “important and legitimate,” it was not convinced
that the regulation was sufficiently related to achieving that inter61
est. Similarly, the Court concluded that the state’s interest in
equal treatment of partisan and independent candidates “simply is
62
not achieved by imposing the March filing deadline on both.” Finally, the Court rejected the interest in political stability because
“the early filing deadline is not precisely drawn to protect the parties from ‘intraparty feuding,’ whatever legitimacy that state goal
63
may have in a [p]residential election.” In short, the law failed rational-basis review. The Court ultimately invalidated the election
provision because its burden “unquestionably outweigh[ed] the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
See id. at 782-83.
See id at 792.
Id. at 790-92.
Id. at 790-91.
See id. at 796-806.
See id at 796.
Id. at 801.
Id. at 805.
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[s]tate’s minimal interest in imposing a March deadline.”64
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,65 the Supreme
Court applied the Anderson test to invalidate Connecticut’s closed
primary statute, which required voters in any political party pri66
mary to be registered members of that party. The state Republican Party, seeking to allow unaffiliated voters to participate in the
Republican primary, challenged the validity of Connecticut’s
closed primary system. Because the Connecticut law required voters in any party primary to be registered members of that party, it
precluded registered voters who were not affiliated with any party
from voting in the Republican primary. The Republican Party,
which had previously adopted a party rule permitting unaffiliated,
or “independent,” voters to vote in its primary, argued that the law
deprived the Party of its right under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to enter into political association with individuals of
67
its own choosing. The District Court, Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and Supreme Court each agreed, holding that the
statute impermissibly interfered with the Republican Party’s free68
dom of association rights.
The Court began its analysis by quoting its earlier opinions for
the proposition that “‘[c]onstitutional challenges to specific provisions of a [s]tate’s election laws . . . cannot be resolved by any
‘litmus-paper test’ that will separate valid from invalid restric69
tions.’” Instead, the Court must follow the test previously stated
70
in Anderson v. Celebrezze.
Applying the Anderson test, the Court found that the challenged laws burdened the right of the Party and its members to associate freely, noting that “the freedom to join together in furtherance of common political beliefs ‘necessarily presupposes the

64. Id. at 806.
65. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
66. See id. at 210-11.
67. See id. at 213.
68. See id. at 213, 224-25.
69. Id. at 213 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (quoting Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974))).
70. The Court must
“consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the [s]tate as justifications for the burden imposed
by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider
the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
plaintiff’s rights.”
Id. at 214 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
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freedom to identify the people who constitute the association.’”71
The statute “limit[ed] the Party’s associational opportunities at the
crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be
translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in
72
the community.” Apparently this burden was sufficiently weighty
to justify strict scrutiny review, for the Court went on to apply this
most stringent standard, in which the issue is whether the state law
is “narrowly tailored . . . [to advance] the [s]tate’s compelling in73
terests.”
Connecticut had asserted four interests, which it characterized
as compelling: minimizing the administrative burden of the primary system; preventing raiding; avoiding voter confusion and
providing for informed voter decisions; and protecting the respon74
The Court ultimately concluded
sibility of party government.
that each of these interests was “insubstantial,” and consequently
75
strict scrutiny was not satisfied.
The Court found that the first asserted interest — that of administrative burden — was “not a sufficient basis . . . for infringing
76
appellees’ First Amendment rights.” The interest in preventing
party raiding, while legitimate, was not implicated, because the
election code did not prevent raids but actually “assist[ed] a raid
by independents,” who, under the law, could register as Republi77
cans at the last minute and thus implement an eleventh-hour raid.
The Court classified as merely “legitimate” the state’s interest in
preventing voter confusion and providing for educated and respon78
sible voter decisions. Finally, the Court disposed of the fourth asserted interest — that of promoting responsiveness of elected officials and strengthening the effectiveness of parties — by noting
that, even if these interests were served, a state “‘may not constitu79
tionally substitute is own judgment for that of the Party.’” Connecticut was attempting to justify its law on the ground that it protected the integrity of the Party against the Party itself; this the
80
state may not do.

71. Id. (quoting Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel.
LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)).
72. Id. at 216.
73. Id. at 217.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 225.
76. Id. at 218.
77. Id. at 219.
78. Id. at 221-22.
79. Id. at 224 (quoting Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex
rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1981)).
80. See id.

CASTRO.CON

534

12/09/97 11:55 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:2

After Tashjian it is clear that political parties have a constitutional right to permit unaffiliated voters to participate in their primaries, even in states with election statutes restricting voting in
primaries to registered party members. Insofar as closed primary
statutes bar participation of unaffiliated voters in party primaries
despite party rules permitting the participation of such voters,
these statutes are unconstitutional. Pursuant to party rules, then, a
state must permit independent/unaffiliated voters as well as party
members to vote in the party primary, even if state law establishes
81
a closed primary.
Then in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
82
Committee, the Court articulated a stricter test for assessing the
83
constitutionality of state election laws. This iteration of the Anderson test would apply strict scrutiny whenever associational
rights are burdened, apparently without regard to the degree of the
burden imposed. The now familiar first step entails determining
whether the law burdens rights protected by the First and Four84
teenth Amendments. Citing Tashjian and Anderson, the Court
then outlined the next step of the inquiry: “[i]f the challenged law
burdens the rights of political parties and their members, it can
survive constitutional scrutiny only if the state shows that it advances a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve
85
that interest.” Later, the Court emphasized “[b]ecause the challenged laws burden the associational rights of political parties and
their members, the question is whether they serve a compelling
86
state interest.”
The plaintiffs in Eu challenged provisions of California’s election code, which banned primary endorsements by the official governing bodies of political parties and imposed various restrictions
87
Specifically, the latter
on the internal governance of parties.
group of restrictions dictated the organization and composition of
party governing bodies, limited the term of office of party chairs,
and required that the chair rotate between residents of northern
88
and southern California.

81. Whether the present-day Court would reach the same result in Tashjian,
however, is an open question. Of the five justices forming the Tashjian majority,
none remain on the Court, while all of the Tashjian dissenters remain. Nonetheless, at this time Tashjian remains good law.
82. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
83. See id. at 222.
84. See id. (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
85. Id. at 222 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 231.
87. See id. at 216.
88. See id.
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Applying the modified Anderson test first to the endorsement
ban, the Eu Court found that the state election code provisions
barring primary endorsements by parties burdened First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, namely political parties’ freedom of
speech and freedom of association.89 Moving to the second step of
90
the analysis, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the provision.
The Court held that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a
91
compelling governmental interest.
The State had offered two interests, stable government and
92
protection of voters from confusion and undue influence. As to
the first, the Court concluded that California had failed to show
the nexus between stable government and a ban on party en93
dorsements. In rejecting the argument that an interest in stable
government includes an interest in party stability, the Court cited
prior cases in which it had drawn a distinction between interparty
and intraparty feuds. Quoting Tashjian, the Court wrote, “a [s]tate
may enact laws ‘to prevent the disruption of the political parties
from without’ but not, as in this case, laws ‘to prevent the parties
from taking internal steps affecting their own process for the selec94
tion of candidates.’” Moreover, it is not for the state to attempt to
save a political party “from pursuing self-destructive acts,” as this
would entail substituting the state’s judgment for that of the
95
party. In conclusion, the Court stated, “preserving party unity
96
during a primary is not a compelling state interest.”
Turning to the second and only remaining interest asserted by
the State, the Court noted that the state has a “legitimate interest
97
in fostering an informed electorate.” But, the Court reasoned,
this interest was not served by a ban on party endorsements, a rule
98
which actually restricts the flow of information to voters.
The Court then turned to the other challenged code provisions
and found that the provisions regulating internal governance of
party organizations burdened political parties’ freedom of association rights by “prevent[ing] the political parties from governing

89. See id. at 222-25.
90. See id. at 225-26.
91. See id. at 229.
92. See id. at 226.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 227 (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,
224 (1986)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 228.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 228-29 (emphasis added).
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themselves with the structure they think best.”99 Significantly,
given the character of the RPA’s claim in O’Callaghan, the Court
observed that
the associational rights at stake are much stronger than those we
credited in Tashjian. There, we found that a party’s right to free
association embraces a right to allow registered voters who are
not party members to vote in the party’s primary. Here, party
members do not seek to associate with nonparty members, but
100
only with one another in freely choosing their party leaders.

Because the laws burdened associational rights, the Court
strictly scrutinized the provisions and the interests they were in101
tended to serve. The State asserted that its regulation of internal
party governance served to preserve the integrity of the election
102
process. The Court found that California had failed to show that
these regulations were necessary to ensure a fair and orderly election process, a process which is, the Court observed, most directly
103
impacted by a party’s external — not internal — affairs. Thus,
none of the challenged election code provisions in Eu survived
104
strict scrutiny review.
In Norman v. Reed,105 the Court applied strict scrutiny to strike
down election laws that limited the right of political association.
The Illinois election laws at issue restricted ballot access by prohibiting use by a new political party of the name of an established
106
party and effectively requiring more signatures to get on the
ballot in a multidistrict political subdivision than required to get on
107
the statewide ballot.
Noting that it had “required any severe restriction to be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling impor108
tance,” the Court apparently deemed these restrictions severe,
for it proceeded to apply strict scrutiny to both measures. Addressing the first challenged law — the prohibition against the use
of the party’s name — the Court stated that it was “far broader
109
than necessary to serve the [s]tate’s asserted interests.” Rather,
the state’s interest in preventing misrepresentation and electoral
99. Id. at 230.
100. Id. at 230-31.
101. See id. at 231.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 232.
104. See id. at 233.
105. 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
106. See id. at 285.
107. See id. at 282-83.
108. Id. at 289 (citing Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 184, 186 (1979)).
109. Id. at 290.
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confusion could be served “merely by requiring the candidates to
get formal permission to use the name from the established party
they seek to represent.”110
As for the signature requirement, the Court stated that
“Illinois has not chosen the most narrowly tailored means of advancing” its interest in ensuring that the electoral support for new
parties in a multidistrict political subdivision extends to every dis111
trict. The Court observed that there were other, less restrictive
112
Thus, strict scrutiny was not
means of advancing this interest.
satisfied and the Court struck down the contested laws.
113
In Burdick v. Takushi, the Court synthesized the test laid out
in Anderson with its subsequent applications of that test in the
following formulation:
[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged
regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to
“severe” restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to
advance a state interest of compelling importance.” But when a
state election law provision imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of voters, “the [s]tate’s important regulatory
114
interests are generally sufficient to justify” the restrictions.

In Burdick, Alan Burdick, a registered voter in Honolulu,
challenged Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting as unconstitu115
tional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Burdick
sought to require the state to provide for the casting, tallying, and
116
Significantly, however, Hawaii’s
publication of write-in votes.
election code already provided three distinct means through which
117
a voter’s chosen candidate may appear on the primary ballot.
One of these mechanisms was a designated nonpartisan primary
ballot on which any nonpartisan may be placed by filing nominating papers containing between fifteen and twenty-five signatures,
118
depending on the office sought, sixty days before the primary.
The Court found the prohibition on write-in voting to be “a

110. Id.
111. Id. at 294.
112. See id. at 293-94.
113. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
114. Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992); Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
115. See id. at 430.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 435-36.
118. See id. at 436.
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very limited”119 burden on voters’ rights. Given the multiple other
ways Hawaii allowed candidates to appear on the ballot, “any
burden on voters’ freedom of choice and association is borne only
by those who fail to identify their candidate of choice until days
120
before the primary.”
Turning next to the interests asserted by Hawaii, the Court
stated that “[b]ecause we have already concluded that the burden
is slight, the [s]tate need not establish a compelling interest to tip
121
Hawaii asserted two
the constitutional scales in its direction.”
interests in barring write-in votes: guarding against the possibility
of unrestrained factionalism at the general election and preventing
122
party raiding. The Court deemed both interests “legitimate” and
determined that the ban was “a reasonable way of accomplishing
123
[the] goal” of preventing party raiding. Thus, the minimal level
of review was satisfied. Burdick illustrates that not all state election laws necessarily impose so high a burden as to warrant the application of strict scrutiny. Where the burden is judged to be quite
modest, the Court will apply considerably less scrutiny to the
challenged laws.
124
Most recently, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
the Court applied the Anderson test to Minnesota election laws
that prohibited a candidate from appearing on the ballot as the
125
candidate of more than one party. This practice of “nomination
by more than one political party of the same candidate for the
126
same office in the same general election” is known as “fusion.”
The Supreme Court determined that the burdens imposed by the
127
fusion ban “though not trivial — are not severe.” Therefore, because strict scrutiny was not warranted, the Court applied only a
128
minimal level of review, and the fusion ban survived.
The Timmons Court drew a distinction between the burden of
a fusion ban and the more weighty burden of state laws such as
129
The Court reiterated that
those at issue in Eu and Tashjian.
“regulation of political parties’ internal affairs and core associa-

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
1996).
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 437.
Id. at 436-37.
Id. at 439.
See id.
Id. at 440.
117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997).
See id. at 1370.
Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 197-98 (8th Cir.
See Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1372.
See id. at 1372, 1375.
See id. at 1370-71.

CASTRO.CON

12/09/97 11:55 AM

1997] SMOTHERING FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

539

tional activities,” such as that found in Eu and Tashjian, imposed
too great a burden to withstand constitutional scrutiny.130 The
Court contrasted those regulations with ones that merely preclude
a candidate who is already on the ballot from being nominated by
131
A regulation of the latter variety, the
a second political party.
Court noted, simply limits candidates to a single nomination, but
does not preclude their nomination by any one party, so long as
132
they are not already the nominee of another party. Therefore, it
is only a question of whether a candidate’s name may appear on
the ballot once or more than once, not whether the candidate’s
133
name may appear once or not at all. The burden of such a regula134
tion, the Court concluded, is “not severe.”
Because of the nature of the burden imposed, “the [s]tate’s asserted regulatory interests need only be ‘sufficiently weighty to jus135
tify the limitation’ imposed on the Party’s rights.” Minnesota’s
interests in preserving the integrity of its election processes and
maintaining the stability of their political system were sufficient to
136
withstand this minimal review. The fusion ban was upheld.
The foregoing review of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence thus makes clear that the balancing test first articulated
in Anderson, and consistently applied by the Court since Anderson, is the appropriate standard by which to assess the validity of
state laws infringing on the freedom of association.
C. State Law Versus Party Rule: The United States Supreme
Court Establishes the Primacy of Party Rules
In addition to the Supreme Court precedent establishing the
appropriate test for laws burdening the right to associate, precedent also exists that specifically pertains to conflicts between state
law and party rules. Given the conflict between Alaska’s blanket
primary law and the RPA’s rule, such precedent is of obvious relevance. The United States Supreme Court has twice before been
confronted with state laws that conflict with party rules, and, in
each instance, has upheld the validity of the party rules.
137
In Cousins v. Wigoda, the first case upholding party rules
130. Id. at 1370.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1372.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992); Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
788 (1983))).
136. See id. at 1373, 1375.
137. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).

CASTRO.CON

540

12/09/97 11:55 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:2

despite contrary provisions of the state election code, the Court invoked a political party’s constitutionally-protected right of political
association to hold that state election law governing selection of
delegates to a national party convention would not be accorded
primacy over the rules of a national political party.138 Instead,
delegates selected in private caucuses, not the delegates selected in
the state-run primary election, were permitted to represent voters
139
at the national party convention.
Later, in Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex
140
rel. LaFollette, the Court upheld the right of national political
parties to refuse to seat delegates at their conventions who were
chosen through state selection processes that violated party rules.
The Wisconsin election code allowed voters not affiliated with the
141
Democratic party to vote in the Democratic primary. The rules
of the National Democratic Party, however, provided that only
persons willing to affiliate publicly with the party could participate
in the process of selecting delegates to the party’s national conven142
The conflict arose because the Wisconsin law required
tion.
delegates to vote at the National Convention in accordance with
143
Thus, the party rules were
the results of the primary election.
violated not by the open nature of the primary, but rather by the
state mandate that party delegates be bound by the results of that
144
primary.
In holding that states may not force a party to honor the results of an open primary by requiring delegates to vote in accord
145
with those primary results, the Court made clear that it was not
deciding the constitutional validity of open primaries; rather its de138. See id. at 487-91.
139. See id. at 478-79. The 59 delegates elected pursuant to the Illinois election
code had sued to prevent the 59 delegates chosen according to party rules from
being seated at the convention. The Illinois Appellate Court agreed with the position of the former group of delegates, declaring that the “right to sit as a delegate representing Illinois at the national nominating convention is governed exclusively by the Illinois Election Code” and, further, that “[t]he interest of the
state in protecting the effective right to participate in primaries is superior to
whatever other interests the party itself might wish to protect.” Wigoda v. Cousins, 302 N.E.2d 614, 626, 629 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). The Supreme Court reversed,
finding that this position violated the associational rights of the latter group of
delegates and of the National Democratic Party, and undermined the Party’s effectiveness in selecting candidates. See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489-90.
140. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
141. See id. at 110-11.
142. See id. at 109.
143. See id. at 112.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 126.
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cision addressed only whether a state, once it has chosen an open
primary format in which non-party members may vote, may force a
national political party to honor the results of that primary, when
those results were reached in violation of national party rules.146
Relying on its decision in Cousins, the Court found this violation
of party rules to be impermissible under the First and Fourteenth
147
The Supreme Court made the observation, now
Amendments.
particularly relevant in evaluating O’Callaghan, that it has
“recognized that the inclusion of persons unaffiliated with a political party may seriously distort its collective decisions — thus impairing the party’s essential functions — and that political parties
may accordingly protect themselves ‘from intrusion by those with
148
adverse political principles.’” The Court also recalled that
the freedom to associate for the “common advancement of political beliefs” necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify
the people who constitute the association and to limit the association to those people only. “Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the free149
dom of its adherents.”

The Court in Democratic Party never reached the application
of any standard of review, since it found all of the asserted interests to be unrelated to the imposition of voting requirements on
150
party delegates. Although it did not specifically state that strict
scrutiny applied, the Court did refer to “compelling interest[s],”
suggesting that strict scrutiny would have been the appropriate
151
standard of review in such a case.

146. See id. at 120.
147. See id. at 121-24. The Court in Democratic Party framed the issue as
“whether the State may compel the National Party to seat a delegation chosen in
a way that violates the rules of the Party” and noted that “this issue was resolved,
we believe, in Cousins v. Wigoda.” Id. at 121 (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 122 (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1952)).
149. Id. (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
150. The Court wrote,
The State asserts a compelling interest in preserving the overall integrity
of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the ballot, increasing voter
participation in primaries, and preventing harassment of voters . . . all [of
which] . . . go to the conduct of the Presidential preference primary —
not to the imposition of voting requirements upon . . . delegates.
Id. at 124-25.
151. Id.
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IV. THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT ERRED IN
O’CALLAGHAN V. STATE
A. The Majority Opinion
Before discussing the errors of the O’Callaghan majority, it is
useful to recount briefly the reasoning of the majority opinion. The
Alaska Supreme Court began its opinion by outlining the background of the litigation and then turned to the standard of review
it would apply. The court correctly identified the Anderson balancing test, as reiterated in Burdick, as the standard by which election laws abridging freedom of association must be judged. The
court quoted at great length, and almost without comment, the
152
United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Burdick.
Then the O’Callaghan majority described the three major
types of primary elections and discussed the history of the blanket
153
primary law in Alaska. Next, the court began a section that it cu154
riously termed “Relevant Case Law.” The court first cited a preTashjian, Washington state case, which had facts similar to those of
155
O’Callaghan. In that case, a challenge to Washington’s blanket
primary law, the Washington court had relied upon two Supreme
Court cases in which the Court had upheld closed primary statutes
156
The outcome of
that had been challenged by excluded voters.
157
one of these cases, Nader v. Schaffer, which the Supreme Court
had affirmed without comment, was effectively reversed by the
158
Court when it subsequently decided Tashjian.
Then, turning to, and ultimately discounting, the relevant
precedent from the United States Supreme Court, the majority acknowledged that in Democratic Party a party rule prevailed over
contrary state law. Nonetheless, the majority attempted to distinguish the holding of Democratic Party “because the Court did not
159
Next, the court focused on
invalidate the state open primary.”
152. See O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1252-54 (Alaska 1996).
153. See id. at 1254-56.
154. Id. at 1256.
155. See id. (citing Heavey v. Chapman, 611 P.2d 1256 (1980)).
156. See Heavey, 611 P.2d at 1258 (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752
(1973); Nader v. Schaffer, 429 U.S. 989 (1976)).
157. 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn.), aff’d, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
158. Surprisingly, this fact is all but ignored by the majority in O’Callaghan.
While the Heavey court, at the time of its decision, may well have been correct in its
reliance on Nader, the same cannot be said of the Alaska Supreme Court’s reliance
on Nader after Tashjian had preempted Nader.
159. O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1259. But, of course, the validity of the state’s
open primary was not the issue decided by the Court in Democratic Party; indeed
the Democratic Party Court expressly declined to consider the issue of the constitu-
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Tashjian, emphasizing that the Tashjian holding “does not confer
per se validity on party rules which conflict with a state’s primary
election laws.”160 Then, shifting from the Supreme Court cases, the
majority cited two California cases, one from a state court and one
from a federal appellate court, both upholding state laws against
161
contrary party rules.
Turning to the assessment of the interests involved, the majority noted that the blanket primary statute burdens political parties’ association rights in two ways: the potential for raiding is increased and the potential for a loss of accountability of candidates
162
The court conto party principles and platform is heightened.
cluded, however, that these risks were not considerably greater
than they would be in the closed primary that the RPA wished to
conduct. It reached this conclusion without the benefit of the
163
RPA’s evidence on the matter.
Finally, the majority considered the state’s interests in encouraging voter turnout, maximizing voters’ choices of candidates,
and ensuring that elected officials have broad-based constituen164
cies. The court characterized these interests as “legitimate and
165
important.” Though the court never articulated which level of
scrutiny it would apply pursuant to the Anderson test, it apparently
did not choose strict scrutiny since these “legitimate and important” state interests were sufficient to uphold the blanket primary
statute. The majority concluded by declaring that the 1992 and
166
1994 primaries were conducted illegally.
B. The O’Callaghan Majority Erred in its Application of the
Anderson Test
As the preceding review of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence illustrates, the Anderson balancing test must be applied to any state regulation infringing on rights of free association.
The Court has utilized this test to assess the constitutionality of
challenged election laws in Anderson, Tashjian, Eu, Norman,
tional validity of an open primary statute.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 1260 (citing Green Party of Cal. v. Jones, 31 Cal. App. 4th 747
(Ct. App. 1995); Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 919 (1993)).
162. See id. at 1263.
163. In a footnote, the court declined the RPA’s suggestion that the case be
remanded to allow the RPA to submit evidence, which it had previously been unable to do as a consequence of joining the litigation late as an intervenor. See id.
at 1261 n.16.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 1262-63.
166. See id. at 1263.
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Burdick, and Timmons. The test, as previously noted, weighs the
character and magnitude of the injury to association rights against
the asserted state interests, while considering the necessity of the
regulation for achieving those interests.
1. Assessment of the burden imposed by the blanket primary
Application of the Anderson test begins with an
statute.
assessment of the burden imposed by the challenged law. To
comprehend fully the burden imposed by Alaska’s blanket primary
statute, we must first consider the role of the primary election in
Alaska’s political system. Under Alaska’s statutory scheme, the
167
only way a political party may have candidates in the general
election is for the candidates to be selected through the primary
168
election. Furthermore, the party has no role, under the election
169
statute, in selecting candidates for the primary election. Indeed,
the only required affiliation between a primary candidate and the
party he purports to represent in the primary is that he be
170
The statute
registered to vote as a member of that party.
requires no other connection between primary candidates and
171
their parties.
Since a party has no means of selecting who can represent it in
the primary, the primary election itself is the party’s only opportunity to express its collective preference for a nominee for the general election. But because voting in the primary election is open to
non-party members, the party cannot use the primary election to
select the nominee of its choice, free of the influence of non-party
members. Consequently, the party never has the opportunity to
select a candidate by a process in which only its members or others
with whom the party wishes to associate participate.
167. A political party is statutorily defined as “an organized group of voters
that represents a political program and that nominated a candidate for governor
who received at least 3% of the total votes cast at the preceding general election
for governor.” ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.010(20) (Michie 1996).
168. See id. § 15.25.010.
169. See id. § 15.25.030. Any member of a political party who conforms with
the statutory requirements pertaining to filing procedure, age, citizenship, and
residency may “file a declaration of candidacy.” Id.
170. See id. § 15.25.030(a)(16).
171. Justice Rabinowitz, in his O’Callaghan dissent, highlighted one way a
party might have some control over who represents it in a primary:
If, for example, only those candidates who received a certain percentage
of votes at a party convention or caucus could run in the primary under
the party’s name, then the party would be assured that the nominees
have received at least some affirmative approval from the party. As it
stands, the party has no control over which candidates use its name.
O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1265 n.4 (Alaska 1996) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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The burden imposed by Alaska’s blanket primary, then, is to
prevent political parties and their members from selecting a nominee of their choice to represent the party in the general election.
As Justice Rabinowitz stated in his dissenting opinion in
O’Callaghan, “Taken together, these laws mandate that any organization which wins more than three percent in the prior election
for governor [the defining characteristic of a “party” under the
172
statute] loses the right to nominate the candidate of its choice.”
This is a substantial burden. Indeed, it goes to the heart of the
constitutional right of freedom of association. When a political
party is denied the opportunity to select a candidate through a
process in which the only participants are those with whom the
party wishes to associate, the party has effectively lost its constitutional right of association.
A fundamental aspect of the right of association, as well as a
central function of political parties, is choosing the person who will
represent the party and its members in the general election. Surely
the matter of who will carry the party name in the general election
is a significant one. Voters in the general election will ascribe certain positions or beliefs to candidates who are nominees of the
Democratic party and will ascribe other positions or beliefs to candidates who are nominees of the Republican party. Voters likely
will also assume certain things about the parties and party members based on the positions and conduct of the nominees who carry
the parties’ names. Consequently, parties and their adherents have
a substantial interest in retaining the opportunity to choose their
nominee by means of a process in which only they participate. The
denial of such an opportunity constitutes a severe abridgement of
the associational rights of parties and their members.
Furthermore, the blanket primary law has ramifications beyond political parties and their members. Because the law forces
the opening of the nominee selection process to persons who are
not party members, voters in the general election will rightly wonder if candidates bearing the labels of Democratic nominee, Republican nominee, or Libertarian nominee have actually garnered
majority support from the parties they purport to represent. Indeed, under current law, it would be possible for the “Republican”
nominee to receive more votes from registered Democrats than
from Republican party members and for the “Democratic” nominee to receive more votes from registered Republicans than from
173
Democratic party members. Because this potentiality exists, per172. Id. at 1266 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
173. This may be the result of intentional raiding, or it simply may be caused
by the failure of party members to participate in the primary in numbers sufficient
to outnumber votes cast by well-intentioned non-party members. Regardless of
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sons voting in a general election for nominees selected through a
blanket primary have less reliable information than they would
have absent the blanket primary. These voters no longer know, for
example, whether or not the nominee bearing the “Republican”
appellation actually has the support of most Republicans. Thus,
the party nomination loses much of its meaning and its ability to
impart information to voters in the general election.
2. Strict scrutiny of Alaska’s interests in a blanket primary.
Because of the severe burden the blanket primary places on
associational rights, Anderson and its progeny mandate the
application of strict scrutiny to Alaska’s blanket primary statute.
Therefore, it was erroneous for the O’Callaghan court to uphold
the statute on the basis of merely “legitimate and important” state
174
Instead, the Alaska Supreme Court should have
interests.
required the state to justify the statute by showing that it was
narrowly tailored to advance compelling state interests.
Had the court utilized the appropriate level of scrutiny, it
would have struck down the blanket primary law, for Alaska’s interests in a blanket primary cannot survive strict scrutiny. Indeed,
175
None of
rarely, if ever, can any interest survive strict scrutiny.
the interests asserted by the states in Tashjian, Eu, or Norman
were sufficient to survive this most intense level of review by the
United States Supreme Court.
Alaska argued that three interests were served by the blanket
primary: maximizing voters’ freedom of choice among candidates,
encouraging voter turnout, and ensuring that elected officials are
representative of the people they govern by forcing parties to have
a broad cross-section of support from the voters. To be sure, none
of these interests is illegitimate. However, to survive strict scrutiny
more is required. The interests must be compelling and the statute
must be narrowly tailored to serve those interests.
First, Alaska asserted its interest in maximizing voters’ freedom of choice. The state, however, has not utilized the least restrictive means of serving this interest. For example, Alaska could
more effectively maximize voter choice, without infringing on associational rights of parties and their members, simply by permitting write-in voting in a separate, non-partisan primary. Under
the cause, it is the prospect that this could occur, that is of import.
174. O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1262-63.
175. The Supreme Court has observed, “Only rarely are statutes sustained in
the face of strict scrutiny. As one commentator observed, strict-scrutiny review is
‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact.” Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 n.6
(1984) (citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term — Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
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such a system, all voters not participating in a party’s primary
would vote a ballot containing the names of all unaffiliated candidates and space to write in the name of any person of the voter’s
choice. Thereby, voter choice would be truly maximized, as voters
would not be limited to persons whose names appear on the ballot.
The person receiving the most votes in this contest would become
the “write-in/unaffiliated nominee” in the general election. Because the state has failed to utilize the most narrowly tailored
means of furthering this interest, strict scrutiny is not satisfied.
The State also asserted an interest in encouraging voter participation. The State did not specify whether its interest is in en176
couraging participation of party voters or unaffiliated voters.
Assuming, arguendo, that the state’s interest is in encouraging the
participation of unaffiliated voters, and further assuming the merits of this interest, strict scrutiny is not satisfied. This interest is just
as effectively served by the less restrictive method of permitting
write-in voting in a non-partisan primary, as described above. In
that system, virtually every registered voter would be able to participate and to cast a ballot for his candidate of choice, whether or
not his choice appeared in print on a ballot. In this way, the associational rights of parties and their members would not be
abridged, but voter turnout would be maximized. Thus, the means
Alaska has utilized is not necessary to further this state interest,
and strict scrutiny is not satisfied.
Finally, Alaska asserted an interest in ensuring that the
“officers elected are representative of the people to be governed”
and that the blanket primary “forces the major political parties to
177
have a broad cross-section of support from the voters.” There is
not even a rational relation between the blanket primary and this
interest. A primary, whether open or closed, does not “elect representatives of the people to be governed”; that is the function of
the general election. Rather, a primary determines party nominees; these nominees, of course, later face off in the general election in which representatives are elected. The time for rallying “a
broad cross-section of support from the voters” is the general election campaign, after party nominees have been chosen by party

176. If the interest is in encouraging the participation of voters who are party
members, then even rational basis review is not satisfied. Such an interest is not
rationally related to the blanket primary statute. This is so because party members actually will be less inclined to participate in a selection process that is adulterated by the participation of members of opposing parties, and more inclined to
participate in the selection of a nominee when the process is more meaningful and
the nominee selected actually is their choice and their choice alone.
177. O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1262.
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members.178 Thus rational basis review, much less strict scrutiny, is
not satisfied.
Moreover, the interests asserted by Alaska fare poorly when
considered in light of the substantial burden imposed by the statute on the right to associate of political parties and their members.
The blanket primary operates to bar political parties and their
members from selecting a nominee of their choice for the general
election, which is a fundamental function of political parties and
one that is integral to the right to associate.
C. The O’Callaghan Majority Disregarded Controlling Supreme
Court Precedent
Beyond misapplying the test for assessing the constitutionality
of election laws, the O’Callaghan court disregarded United States
Supreme Court precedent indicating that the blanket primary statute should be struck down. First there is Tashjian. Significantly,
the Tashjian Court acknowledged the critical importance to a po179
litical party of the selection of a party nominee. State regulations,
such as those challenged in Tashjian and O’Callaghan, which infringe on a party’s freedom to determine who may vote in its primaries “limit the Party’s associational opportunities at the crucial
juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the
180
community.”
More than this, the holding in Tashjian establishes that freedom of association affords political parties the right to determine
who may participate in their nominee selection process, and insofar as state law conflicts with the party’s determination in this regard, the law is invalid. In striking down state law limits upon who
may participate in party primaries, the Court wrote that “the
Party’s determination of the boundaries of its own association, and
of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is
181
protected by the Constitution.” The Court affirmed the Second
Circuit’s holding that a state law which “‘substantially interferes
with the Republican Party’s [F]irst [A]mendment right to define its
178. Besides, with or without a blanket primary, party members have a strong
and obvious incentive to select a nominee for the general election who can attract “a
broad cross-section of support from the voters.” If a party fails to choose such a
nominee, it likely will lose the general election, especially in a state such as Alaska
where the number of undeclared and non-partisan voters significantly exceeds the
membership of the “major” political parties. Therefore, the blanket primary statute
is not necessary to achieve this asserted interest.
179. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 215-16 (1986).
180. Id. at 216.
181. Id. at 224.
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associational boundaries . . . and engage in effective political association’” is unconstitutional.182 Thus, while Tashjian dealt with a
closed rather than an open primary, it plainly established the right
of parties to define their associational boundaries, a right which includes the determination of who may participate in the party’s selection of a nominee. In this way, Tashjian controls the outcome in
O’Callaghan.
Democratic Party is also directly pertinent to the issue in
O’Callaghan. In Democratic Party, of course, state law opened the
Democratic primary to voters not affiliated with the Democratic
party; the party wished to restrict participation to party members
only. There the Court held that the state may not control the process whereby a political party selects delegates for its national con183
Justice Rabinowitz correctly observed in his
vention.
O’Callaghan dissent that “[d]elegates select candidates, and therefore interference in the delegate selection process is interference in
184
Thus, Democratic Party comthe candidate selection process.”
pels the conclusion that state interference in a party’s nominee selection process, like state interference in a party’s selection of
185
delegates, is impermissible. And so, in both Tashjian and Democratic Party, party rules ultimately prevailed over the state laws
which attempted to close and open, respectively, the selection
process.
The Court in Eu, as well, made several observations that are
useful in evaluating O’Callaghan. First, the Court noted that “[a]
[s]tate’s broad power to regulate the time, place, and manner of
elections ‘does not extinguish the [s]tate’s responsibility to observe
the limits established by the First Amendment rights of the
186
[s]tate’s citizens.’” Continuing, the Court wrote,
Freedom of association means not only that an individual voter
has the right to associate with the political party of her choice,
but also that a political party has a right to “‘identify the people
182. Id. at 229 (quoting Republican Party of Conn. v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265,
283 (2d Cir. 1985)).
183. See Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette,
450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981).
184. O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1266 (Alaska 1996) (Rabinowitz, J.,
dissenting).
185. Cf. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975) (upholding party rules
over contrary provisions of state election code). It also warrants mention that the
Democratic Party Court cited with approval Professor Lawrence Tribe who wrote,
“freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if associations could not
limit control over their decisions to those who share the interests and persuasions
that underlie the association’s being.” Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 122 n.22.
186. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222
(1989) (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217).
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who constitute the association,’” and to select a “standard bearer
187
who best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.”

The Burdick majority arguably expressed a dim view of blan188
ket primaries. In a footnote, the majority addressed the dissent’s
argument that because primary voters are required to opt for a
specific partisan or nonpartisan ballot — as is the case in both
closed and traditional open primaries — they are foreclosed from
voting in those races in which no candidate appears on their chosen ballot. But, noted the majority, “this is generally true of primaries; voters are required to select a ticket, rather than choose
189
from the universe of candidates running on all party slates.” The
Court went on to quote an earlier case in which it had held that
“‘the [s]tate may determine that it is essential to the integrity of
the nominating [petition] process to confine voters to supporting
one party and its candidates in the course of the same nominating
190
process.’”
Subsequent to the O’Callaghan decision, the Supreme Court
in Timmons made the following highly pertinent observations:
The New Party’s claim that it has a right to select its own candidate is uncontroversial . . . . See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda . . .
(Party, not [s]tate, has right to decide who will be [s]tate’s delegates at party convention.). That is, the New Party, and not
someone else, has the right to select the New Party’s “standard
191
bearer.”

Finally, the Court’s comments in an earlier case, Rodriguez v.
192
Popular Democratic Party, are also instructive. In this case, the
Court was reviewing a Puerto Rico statute that gave a political
party the authority to appoint an interim replacement for a party
member who vacated a position in the legislature. When the appointing party excluded nonmembers of the party from the selection process, the nonmembers alleged a violation of their right of
association. The Court, however, disagreed, writing, “The Party
was entitled to adopt its own procedures to select this replacement;
it was not required to include non-members in what can be analo193
gized to a party primary election.”

187. Id. at 224 (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214 (quoting Democratic Party,
450 U.S. at 122); Ripon Soc’y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567,
601 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) (citations omitted).
188. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 437 n.7 (1992).
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 786 (1974)).
191. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1997)
(emphasis added).
192. 457 U.S. 1 (1982).
193. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
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V. CONCLUSION
In upholding Alaska’s blanket primary statute, the Alaska Supreme Court committed two substantial errors, the result of which
has been a significant diminution of the associational rights of political parties and their members in Alaska. The Court erred first
by misapplying the Anderson test and second by disregarding controlling United States Supreme Court precedent. In so doing, the
court has commenced the erosion of an important First Amendment right.
It warrants mention that other jurisdictions, including California and Virginia, have recently grappled with the constitutionality
of blanket and open primary statutes. In March 1996, California
194
voters approved Proposition 198, the “Open Primary Act,” pro195
viding for a blanket primary election in that state. The measure,
which goes into effect in 1998, provides that “[a]ll persons entitled
to vote, including those not affiliated with any political party, shall
have the right to vote, except as otherwise provided by law, at any
election in which they are qualified to vote, for any candidate re196
Like Alaska’s
gardless of the candidate’s political affiliation.”
blanket primary statute, Proposition 198 squarely raises the issue
of whether political parties have a constitutionally-protected right
to prevent political opponents from participating in the selection of
party candidates. The major political parties in California oppose
the law, and the Republican, Democratic, Libertarian, and Peace
& Freedom parties have challenged the new blanket primary law
in a lawsuit filed in federal court in Sacramento’s Eastern Dis197
trict. The case was heard by Judge David Levi in July 1997, and
198
the judge considered further arguments in September 1997.
Also, a challenge to Virginia’s open primary law was brought
recently in federal court in Virginia by two state Republican Party
members, including the chairman of the state party. The law provides that “[a]ll persons qualified to vote . . . may vote at the primary. No person shall vote for the candidates of more than one

194. The appellation “Open Primary Act” is, in fact, a misnomer, for the primary system it adopts is actually a blanket, not open, primary.
195. See Cal. Prop. 198 (1996) (to be codified at CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2001
(West 1997)).
196. Id.
197. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, No. CIV-S-96-2038 (E.D. Cal.
filed Nov. 21, 1996).
198. See Telephone Interview with George Waters, of Olson, Hagel, Fong,
Leidigh, Waters & Fishburn, L.L.P., counsel of record for the Democratic, Libertarian, and Peace & Freedom Parties of California (Aug. 19, 1997) At the time
this Note went to press in November 1997, the court had not yet issued its decision.
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party.”199 This, then, establishes an open primary.
200
The plaintiffs in Marshall v. Meadows alleged that the open
primary law is an unconstitutional infringement on their right to
associate freely with other citizens for the advancement of shared
political objectives, a right guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiffs objected to the ability of Democrats and
independents, under the law, to participate in the selection of the
201
Republican nominee for United States Senate.
The district court dismissed the action on procedural grounds
and did not address the merits of the case. The basis of the dis202
missal was a lack of standing on the part of the plaintiffs, and
laches because the suit was commenced only ninety-five days be203
On January 24, 1997, the Fourth
fore the scheduled primary.
Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing, declined to address whether an open primary injures a political party and its
204
members, and dismissed the appeal.
Alaska’s blanket primary law also continues to face legal
challenge. In February 1995, as the Alaska Supreme Court prepared to consider O’Callaghan v. State, the Republican Party of
205
Alaska filed suit in federal district court in Alaska seeking declaratory and injunctive enforcement of the same Party rule at issue in O’Callaghan, the rule that would limit participation in the
Republican primary election to registered Republicans, registered
independents, and persons who state no party preference when
206
registering to vote.
After the Alaska Supreme Court’s April 1996 decision in
O’Callaghan, the District Court in July 1996 denied the plaintiffs’
motions for a preliminary injunction and for partial summary
207
judgment. District Judge H. Russel Holland denied the motion
for preliminary injunctive relief because, although “there is a
strong likelihood of plaintiffs’ success on the merits of the under208
lying constitutional issue,” there is also a “serious question” as to
whether the res judicata doctrine will preclude the plaintiffs from

199. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-530 (Michie 1997).
200. 921 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 105 F.3d 904 (4th Cir. 1997).
201. See id. at 1491, 1493.
202. The State Republican Party was not a plaintiff in the action; only its
chairman was involved. See id. at 1492-93.
203. See id. at 1491, 1494.
204. See Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 906-07 (4th Cir. 1997).
205. See Ross v. State, No. A95-0053-CV (D. Alaska filed Feb. 16, 1995).
206. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at 6-7, Ross v. State (No. A95-0053-CV).
207. See Order of July 17, 1996 at 2, Ross v. State (No. A95-0053-CV).
208. Id.
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relitigating the constitutionality of the blanket primary law.209 The
summary judgment motion was denied because “[t]he court has
not yet decided whether the plaintiffs’ associational rights which
are at issue in this case are to be subject to a strict scrutiny analy210
sis, or whether some less demanding test will apply.”
Subsequently, likely in an effort to remedy the res judicata
problem noted by Judge Holland, plaintiffs filed a Third Amended
211
Complaint on July 31, 1997, alleging that Alaska’s blanket primary violates not just the state party rule at issue in O’Callaghan
but also Rule 34(f) of the National Republican Party. This national party rule was enacted on August 12, 1996 and provides, in
pertinent part:
On or after January 1, 1997, no state law or party rule shall be
observed that allows persons who have participated or are participating in the selection of any nominee of a party other than
the Republican Party, including, but not limited to, through the
use of a multi-party primary or similar type ballot, to participate
in the selection of a nominee of the Republican Party for that
general election. No person nominated in violation of this rule
shall be recognized as the nominee of the Republican Party. If
state law or state party rule provides for the selection of the
nominee of the Republican Party in violation of this rule, the
Republican nominee shall be selected by a convention . . . unless
212
a state party rule provides specifically to the contrary.

In addition, the Alaska Libertarian Party, the Alaskan Independence Party, and former Lieutenant Governor John B. Coghill, now
the chairman of the Alaskan Independence Party, joined the suit
213
as plaintiffs.
The continuing litigation surrounding open and blanket primaries means that the United States Supreme Court likely will
again have the opportunity to rule definitively on the constitutionality of such primary elections. It should do so, in the interest of
settling this significant question of constitutional law.
Brian M. Castro

209. Id. at 8. Res judicata applies to state court determinations of federal constitutional issues. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
210. Order of July 31, 1996 at 1, Ross v. State (No. A95-0053-CV).
211. Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and
Other Relief at 8, Ross v. State (No. A95-0053-CV).
212. Id.
213. See id. at 3-4.

